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Abstract
In this paper we suggest a simple empirical and model-independent measure of
Central Banks’ Conservatism, based on the Taylor curve. This new indicator can
easily be extended in time and space, whatever the underlying monetary regime
of the considered countries. We demonstrate that it evolves in accordance with
the monetary experiences of 32 OECD member countries from 1980, and is largely
equivalent to the model-based measure provided by Krause & Me´ndez [Southern
Economic Journal, 2005]. We finally bring forward the interest of such an indicator
for further empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of Central Banks.
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1 Introduction
For at least three decades, normative academic studies on optimal monetary policy rules
have relied on the assumption that the monetary authorities follow a quadratic loss func-
tion, which penalizes the deviation of the objective variables from their respective target.
Precisely, this loss function includes on the one hand the deviation of inflation with re-
spect to its target and on the other hand the gap between GDP and its potential (i.e. the
output gap). As there is an inflation-output variability trade-off, each of these objective
variables are weighted according to the relative importance given by the authorities. The
more the relative weight on inflation (output gap) stabilization in the loss function, the
more vigorous the reaction coefficient on inflation (output) in its policy rule, at the expense
of a higher output (inflation) variability. The determination of optimal monetary policies
requires a measure of relative preferences. Since they are a priori unknown, economists
had to either assign “ad hoc” preferences to Central Banks, or to deal with a large range of
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preference parameters to determine an efficient policy frontier, instead of a single optimal
policy rule.
This was the case until Woodford (2003) demonstrated that the usual quadratic loss
function ascribed to the Central Bank can be derived from the utility function of the
representative agent1. This approach gives two advantages. First, it justifies the microeco-
nomic foundations of the objective of the Central Bank to fight against inflation. Second,
it removes any uncertainty surrounding the value of the preference parameters, as the
latter might be determined by a combination of structural parameters of the underlying
macroeconomic model.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis - now accepted as an norm - that Central Banks’ pref-
erences match those of the society, should be empirically evaluated. There are at least
three arguments calling for a reevaluation. First, a large strand of the literature start-
ing with Rogoff (1985) has demonstrated that a central banker more conservative than
the society was a desirable solution to solve the inflation bias problem. In this view, the
Central Bank and the households do not share the same preferences. Second, while the
relative anti-inflationary preferences of the agents have considerably decreased2 since the
1980s (due to the actual non-inflationary environment), keeping a low inflation remains
the top priority of the Central Banks. Moreover, the preferences of the median voter vary
over time, therefore explaining political changes. If the Central Bank were to follow these
varying preferences, its behavior would change each time a new government or parliament
house is installed. However, this is at odds with the main principle of Central Bank inde-
pendence (hereafter CBI). Third, the Central Bank conservatism (hereafter CBC) is likely
to be explained not only by economical structural parameters, but also by institutional
and political factors (e.g. legal status of the Central Bank, political check and balances,
political stability, wage-setting institutions, parliamentary systems), as it is the case for
CBI3.
So, such a measure of Central Banks’ preferences, actually a measure of CBC, is needed
in order to evaluate the assumption of an utility-based Central Bank’s loss function. Un-
fortunately, there are very few attempts to reveal it, contrary for instance to the numerous
indicators of CBI4, and even the existing references give very heterogeneous results due to
their model-dependence. In order to fill this gap, the objective of this article is to provide a
simple and reliable measure of CBC. Based on the Taylor curve, we construct an empirical
indicator, labelled CONS, which can easily be expanded in time and space, whatever the
underlying monetary regime. Moreover, we demonstrate that our indicator is reliable. Not
1For details, see Woodford (2003, Chap. 6).
2For the European countries see for instance the Eurobarometer Survey Series published by the Euro-
pean Commission.
3See e.g. Eijffinger & De Haan (1996), Farvaque (2002), D’amato, Pistoresi & Salsano (2009).
4See e.g. Banaian (2008) for a detailed survey of CBI indicators. This can explain why the relation
between CBC and CBI is still not well-known. This point will be discussed in section 5.
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only does it evolve in accordance with the monetary history of the 32 OECD countries
over the 1980-1998 period, but it is also largely equivalent to the model-based measure
provided by Krause & Me´ndez (2005). However, a main difference remains: their measure
assumes a monetary policy based on an interest rate rule, what is inappropriate for coun-
tries following a currency board, a money growth targeting or an exchange rate pegging.
This limits the geographical extension of their indicator, whereas the CONS measure does
not require this restrictive (and sometimes fallacious) assumption.
This paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the literature, focusing
on Krause & Me´ndez (2005), whose results are taken as a reference. The method for
determining an alternative CBC indicator and the corresponding results for the OECD
countries are presented in section 3. Some comparisons through time and space reveal that
the CONS indicator is in compliance with the monetary history and reputation of the
countries under study. Moreover, we demonstrate in section 4 that CONS is equivalent to
the measure provided by Krause & Me´ndez (2005) in terms of optimal monetary policy and
resulting interest rate paths. In section 5 the advantages of such an indicator are brought
forward for further empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of Central Banks. The
last section concludes.
2 The existing literature
For at least three decades, academic studies about optimal monetary policy have assumed
that the Central Bank optimizes a quadratic loss function following:
L = Et
[
λ (pit − pit)2 + (1− λ) (yt − yt)2
]
with 0 6 λ 6 1 (1)
where λ represents the preferences of the Central Bank regarding the stabilization of infla-
tion (pit) around its target pit, relatively to the weight attached to the stabilization of the
output gap (yt − y). The higher λ, the more the Centrak Bank is said conservative in the
sense of Rogoff (1985).
There are very few attempts in the literature to reveal the CBC. The main contributions
rely on a similar method, which consists in deducing the λ parameter in (1) by an iden-
tification procedure from an estimated small scale (static or dynamic) backward-looking
macroeconomic model including a Taylor Rule5. These studies have at least three limits.
First, they only concern a small sample of countries, what consequently renders impossible
a large sample econometrical study of the CBC determinants (as for example the institu-
tional or political ones). Second, the degree of CBC considerably varies from a study to
an other. As an example, the table 1 reports the weight on output relative to inflation
stabilization, i.e. the value of (1− λ)/λ, found in the literature for the United States. In
line with the dual mandate of the FED, Ozlale (2003) finds a nearly equivalent weight for
5Dennis (2006) differs slightly from other studies by using likelihood methods to jointly estimate the
policy constraints and the policymaker’s decision rule.
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output and inflation stabilization in the FED’s loss function. The importance of output
stabilization is confirmed by Cecchetti & Ehrmann (2002) and Krause & Me´ndez (2005)
- hereafter KM. Neverthless, the weight attached to the output stabilization is insignifi-
cant according to the remaining studies6. As the studying period and the methodological
approach are quiet the same, these differences suggest that the results are very model-
dependent. Third, these contributions offer a constant value of λ, covering their entire
sample. Certainly, the CB preferences are not likely to radically change in the short run.
However some evolutions are possible and should be taken into account. Indeed, the de-
gree of conservatism might tipically change when a country turns to an Inflation Targeting
framework, when it decides to follow a disinflation policy, when it changes its exchange
rate regime, or when the independence of its Central Bank is legally modified.
Reference (1− λ)/λ Period
Ozlale (2003) 0.49 1979 : 3− 1999 : 1
Cecchetti & Ehrmann (2002) 0.35 1981 : 1− 1997 : 4
Krause & Me´ndez (2005)(1) 0.17 1978 : 1− 2000 : 4
Dennis (2006) 0.00 1982 : 1− 2000 : 2
Favero & Rovelli (2003) 0.00 1980 : 3− 1998 : 3
Castelnuovo & Surico (2003,2004) 0.00 1987 : 3− 2001 : 1
Tachibana (2004) 0.00 1980 : 1− 2000 : 4
(1) Here is considered the mean value of the quarterly (1− λ)/λ found over the mentionned period
Table 1: The results found in the literature about the United States
It is worth noting that KM constitutes one of the most advanced contribution, as it is
not concerned by the first nor the third limit. In line with the aforementioned references,
they consider a usual quadratic loss function as (1), a simple static AD-AS model, and a
policy rule which is defined as i = βyd+βpis, with i the short-term interest rate, and d and s
the demand and supply shocks respectively. Minimizing (1) under the constraints imposed
by the structure of the underlying AD-AS model leads to analytically determine the optimal
reaction coefficients of the policy rule (β∗pi and β
∗
y). Obviously, the latter depends on the
structural parameters of the model and on the degree of policy maker’s conservatism λ.
In other words, noting Φ the parameters of the AD-AS model, they analytically find
β∗pi = f (Φ, λ). The parameter λ can then equivalently be formulated in terms of the
reaction coefficients and the structural parameters of the model7, so that: λ = g (Φ, β∗pi).
Following this latter relation, and assuming that policy makers act optimally, they make
6Using an alternative method based on inverse-control theory, Salemi (1995) finds a clear decrease in
the weight attached to the output stabilization since 1982.
7Note that contrary to Woodford (2003, Chap. 6), the λ coefficient is not derived here from the utility
function of a representative household. The degree of conservatism is exogenous. However it is always
possible to rewrite the analytical expression of the optimal coefficient βpi, which depends in part on λ, in
order to pass the latter on the left side, and so formulating it in terms of βpi.
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rolling regressions of dynamic near-VAR models in order to proceed to the identification of
all the parameters (Φ, β∗pi). They can finally deduce annualy estimates of λ for 24 countries,
from 1978 to 2002.
While perceptive, this way of revealing policy maker’s preferences is also obviously
model-dependent. In particular, they make the assumption that all the countries of their
sample followed an interest rate rule, which was actually not the case, including for the
OECD’s countries at the early 1980s. On the contrary, in this paper, we propose an alter-
native measure of CBC, directly based on empirical observations, and easily expendable
to a large set of countries, whatever the monetary policy regime.
3 Measuring Central Banks’ Conservatism: A simple
empirical approach
Our measure of CBC is inspired by the seminal paper of Taylor (1979), which argued for
the existence of a “second order Phillips curve”, in the sense that a monetary authority
faces a permanent trade-off between the volatility of inflation and that of the output gap.
This trade-off, leading to the negatively sloped so-called “Taylor curve”, is represented in
the figure 1, with the variability of the inflation rate (σ2pi) on the horizontal axis and the
variability of the output gap (σ2y) on the vertical axis. This curve is found joining all the
theoretical (σ2pi,i, σ
2
y,i)-pairs resulting from optimal monetary policies under given values of
λi in (1), and given a structural model of the economy.
 
Figure 1: The Taylor Curve and the inflation-output variability trade-off
According to this theoretical standpoint, the observed position of an economy on this
curve reveals the preferences of the Central Bank in terms of inflation stabilization (σ2pi)
relatively to the output one (σ2y). Indeed, while the first bisector corresponds to the case
in which monetary authorities assign an equal weight to inflation and output variability
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in their loss function (1), a Central Bank is said more and more conservative as its corre-
sponding point grows up along the Taylor curve from the right to the left, i.e. as inflation
is more (and more) weighted than output variability in its loss function. For example,
the point A in the figure 1 illustrates a case in which the Central Bank is more adverse
to inflation variability than for the point B (σ2piA < σ
2
piB), while tolerating more output
variability (σ2yA > σ
2
yB). The point A then reveals a more conservative stance than the
point B.
This is the rationale for the method we put forward in this paper in order to reveal
a new and easily computable index of CBC. This new index is based on the value of the
angle of the straight line joining the origin and a given point on the Taylor Curve. Indeed,
knowing empirical volatilities of inflation and output gap, i.e. respectively the adjacent
side and opposite side in this case, it is possible to calculate any angle value, following the
usual trigonometrical formula: angle(α) = atan(σ2y/σ
2
pi) × 180/pi. Once rescaled to [0, 1],
this angle measure constitutes a fair estimate of the relative degree of CBC, equivalent to
the λ parameter of the loss function (1). In this line, we suggest a new method to calculate
an indicator of CBC, noted CONS, given by:
CONS =
1
90
[
atan
(
σ2y
σ2pi
)
× 180
pi
]
(2)
As σ2y and σ
2
pi are easily observable whatever the country, over any period, computing
this index is direct, simple and consistent with the theoretical literature based on the Taylor
Curve8. This measure is illustrated in the right chart of the figure 1. Taking the United
Kingdom as an example, the point B and A refer to the sub-periods 1980-84 and 1985-89
respectively. In line with Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), a straightening of the conservatism
of the Bank of England is observed from the first to the second sub-period, with an increase
of the angle from 23◦ (αˆB) to 77◦ (αˆA), corresponding to an increase of CONS from 0.25
to 0.85 respectively, according to (2).
As a whole, following the formula (2), we calculate this CONS index for a large sample
of OECD countries using quarterly data from 1980 Q1 to 1998 Q4, since many of OECD
countries have joined the European Monetary Union in 1999. The data are drawn from the
IMF’s International Finance Statistics and the OECD database. As the CBC is not likely
to be very volatile, we consider four non-overlapping sub-periods: 1980 Q1 - 1984 Q4, 1985
Q1 - 1989 Q4, 1990 Q1 - 1994 Q4, and 1995 Q1 - 1998 Q4. The output gap is calculated
as the residuals of a regression of the log of real GDP on a constant and a quadratic trend
(see e.g. Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998)). Inflation and output gap volatilities correspond
to their respective variance. Results are reported in the table 2.
8Of course, other factors, independent of the monetary policy and beyond central banks’ control, such
as demand or supply shocks, can in practice affect σ2y and σ
2
pi. This point will be discussed in detail in
section 5, in which we present notably an alternative CONS index that takes shocks into account.
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Country 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-98 Average 80-98
Australia 0.501 0.882 0.497 0.174 0.513
Austria 0.318 0.805 0.978 0.847 0.737
Belgium 0.717 0.630 0.967 0.888 0.801
Canada 0.487 0.993 0.733 0.962 0.794
Chile 0.693 0.655 0.612 0.981 0.735
Czech Republic 0.737 0.918 0.828
Denmark 0.428 0.971 0.972 0.964 0.834
Estonia 0.012 0.196 0.104
Finland 0.504 0.970 0.961 0.989 0.856
France 0.096 0.763 0.944 0.927 0.682
Germany 0.669 0.852 0.917 0.872 0.827
Greece 0.652 0.398 0.424 0.534 0.502
Iceland 0.022 0.571 0.388 0.994 0.494
Ireland 0.034 0.687 0.969 0.946 0.659
Israel 0.004 0.007 0.666 0.819 0.374
Italy 0.285 0.562 0.861 0.201 0.477
Japan 0.829 0.902 0.910 0.665 0.826
Korea Republic 0.038 0.693 0.352 0.953 0.509
Mexico 0.016 0.007 0.145 0.107 0.069
Netherlands 0.655 0.504 0.967 0.952 0.769
New Zealand 0.293 0.388 0.865 0.558 0.526
Norway 0.372 0.881 0.899 0.944 0.774
Poland 0.002 0.150 0.076
Portugal 0.449 0.651 0.78 0.886 0.691
Slovak Republic 0.383 0.564 0.473
Slovenia 0.002 0.399 0.200
Spain 0.678 0.784 0.961 0.833 0.814
Sweden 0.588 0.897 0.626 0.823 0.733
Switzerland 0.715 0.717 0.713 0.920 0.766
Turkey 0.001 0.032 0.113 0.158 0.076
United Kingdom 0.254 0.856 0.544 0.896 0.637
United States 0.572 0.873 0.774 0.911 0.782
Table 2: The CONS index for 32 OECD Countries (4 sub-periods and average)
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A preliminary assessment of the factual properties of this index can be made with
respect to the monetary history of OECD countries. First, we plot in figure 2 the values of
CONS index for different periods in order to assess its evolution. As a whole, the fact that
most countries are located above the 45◦ line indicates a general increase of CBC in OECD
economies, between the first and the second sub-periods considered (indicated in horizontal
and vertical axis respectively). This is clearly the case between the 1980s and the 1990s (left
plot), this latter decade often described as the ”Great Moderation”. Such an evolution of
CBC particularly reflects changes in Central Banks’ legislation and in their practices and,
more generally the changing face of central banking over the last three decades (see e.g.
Siklos (2002), Crowe & Meade (2007)). The right plot of the figure 2 shows furthermore
that this increase of CBC obviously starts over the 1980s, decade characterized by active
disinflation policies in many OECD countries.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Central Banks’ Conservatism since 1980
Second, we plot in figure 3 the CONS index with the log of inflation for two periods:
1980-99 and 1995-98. As it can be seen, there exists a negative relationship between the
degree of CBC and the inflation level. This means that, on average, conservative Central
Banks are associated with lower inflation rates than non-conservative ones. This result is
in line with previous empirical findings indicating a positive link between inflation level
and inflation variability. It is also consistent with studies reporting a tight relationship
between CBI and inflation performance (see e.g. De Haan & Klomp (2010)).
Finally, we study whether the evolution of CONS index is linked to monetary and insti-
tutional arrangements. Figure 4 (left plot) shows CONS index for the inflation targeting
countries before and after the adoption of this monetary policy framework9. We can see
that all the countries, excepted Australia and to a lesser extend Sweden, are located above
9Over the decade 1990-99, twelve OECD countries have made the choice of adopting inflation targeting.
These countries are: New Zealand (1990), Canada (1991), Chile (1991), United Kingdom (1992), Israel
(1992), Australia (1993), Finland (1993), Sweden (1993), Spain (1995), Czech Republic (1997), Poland
(1998), and Korea (1998).
8
-0,5 
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
2 
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 
Lo
g_
In
fla
tio
n 
(1
99
5-
98
) 
CONS (1995-98) 
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
2 
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 
Lo
g_
In
fla
tio
n 
(1
98
0-
98
) 
CONS (1980-98) 
Figure 3: Central banks’ conservatism and inflation performance
the 45◦ line. This may indicate an increase in the weight assigned to the stabilization of
inflation in the loss function of inflation targeting Central Banks. Also, it seems to agree
with the view of inflation targeting opponents who criticize this monetary policy strategy
for excessively focusing on the inflation objective. The right plot in figure 4 shows the
evolution of CONS index between the 1980 and 1990 decades for the countries (excepted
Luxembourg) that have joined the European Monetary Union in 1999. Results indicate a
relatively high increase of CBC in these ten countries. They reflect the institutional and
monetary features of the European integration laid down in the Maastricht Treaty (1992),
with as reference the Bundesbank, known as one of the most independent and conservative
Central Bank in the world. Hence, these plots seem to capture the major evolutions of
institutional and monetary history of OECD countries and their central banking practices.
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Figure 4: Monetary arrangements and the evolution of Central Banks’ conservatism
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4 Is CONS a reliable indicator?
In absolute terms, it is impossible to determine whether CONS is a good measure of
conservatism. Nevertheless, the previous section demonstrated that the CONS index
delivers very intuitive and coherent information about the preferences of Central Banks for
the 32 OECD countries considered, given their past experiences (in terms of disinflation
policies, adoption of Inflation Targeting framework, transition to EMU, reputation, etc.).
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Figure 5: The link between CONS and KM
We now compare in this section the CONS index with the indicator provided by KM,
which constitutes a valuable reference in terms of CBC measure. The figure 5 (left plot)
displays the correlation between CONS and a 5-year mean value of the indicator computed
by Krause & Me´ndez (noted KM and corresponding to the sub-periods considered in this
paper) for a common sample of 25 countries10. As indicated in table 3, the two measures
are highly correlated, with a Pearson coefficient of 71.6%. The link between the 1980-1998
mean value of KM and CONS is even better (cf. right plot of figure 5); the corresponding
Pearson coefficient reaches 85.8% in this case. The Spearman ranking correlation confirms
the substantial link between the two indicators, but with a lower correlation for the first
sub-period. This difference with KM for the 1980-1984 period is not unfavorable to our
indicator. Indeed, contrary to us, KM assume that the countries followed an interest rate
policy rule, which was not true for a majority of countries over this first sub-period.
Mean 1980-98 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-98 4 sub-periods
Pearson Coef. 0,8581 0,4521 0,7637 0,7985 0,7536 0.716
Spearman Coef. 0,6991 0,2609 0,5726 0,8366 0,6568 -
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients between λCONS and λKM
10Precisely, we refer to the extended sample of countries considered in Krause & Me´ndez (2008). These
data are available for download at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/ skrause/pdf/Lambdas.xls
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In order to compare further our measure with KM , we demonstrate that both indexes
yield comparable optimal policy rules. The method we propose to this end relies on the
model used by KM to identify the parameters defining λ in their paper, based on Mojon
& Peersman (2001) and given by:
y˜t = β1r
(˜
it−1 − p˜it−1
)
+ β1f f˜t−1 +
∑2
j=1 β1j y˜t−j +
∑2
j=1 β1(j+2)p˜it−j + εyt
p˜it = β2r
(˜
it−1 − p˜it−1
)
+ β2f f˜t−1 +
∑2
j=1 β2j y˜t−j +
∑2
j=1 β2(j+2)p˜it−j + εpit
f˜t = α1f˜t−1 + α2f˜t−2 + εft
i˜t = βyy˜t + βpip˜it + εit
(3)
Exactly as in KM, y˜t = yt− y¯t represents the output gap, with yt the log of GDP and y¯t
its potential, obtained by applying a HP filter. p˜it is the difference between the annualized
change in Consumer Price Index and its target given by the linear trend of inflation. f is a
variable whose aim is to capture the foreign disturbances. It is defined as the “external price
inflation” by KM, and computed as the sum of the nominal exchange rate devaluation and
the foreign inflation11. f˜t is ft minus its mean value. i˜t is the demeaned 3-month monetary
interest rate. The two first relations represent the AD and AS equations respectively.
While f˜ is purely exogenous in KM, we defined it here as a fully-fledge equation in order
to close the model. As usual for shocks process, it is assumed that f˜t only depends on its
past values, following an AR(2) specification. The last equation is the monetary policy
rule.
This system is estimated with the GMM over the 1990 Q1 - 1998 Q4 period, excepted
for Turkey and Israel for which the estimations start in 1986 Q2 and 1989 Q4 respectively12.
Then, for each country, we proceed to the minimization of the loss function (1) with respect
to {βy, βpi}, subject to the constraints imposed by the estimated structure of the system
(3), and successively considering λKM and λCONS, the 1980-1998 mean value of KM and
CONS respectively. Details about the method can be found in appendix 1. We then obtain
two alternative optimal policy rules13, with reaction coefficients noted (β∗y,KM , β
∗
pi,KM) and
(β∗y,CONS, β
∗
pi,CONS), associated to λKM and λCONS respectively. Finally, the estimated
policy rule is successively replaced by this two optimal rules in the system (3), which is
then submitted to dynamic historical simulations. Two series of simulated interest rates
11Concretely, ft = et+pi
f
t . et is the annualized percentage change of the exchange rate to the U.S. dollar,
except of the U.S. (U.S.$ / U.K.£ exchange rate). pift , the external inflation, is given by the annualized
U.S. CPI inflation, except for the United States (annualized U.K. CPI inflation).
12The set of instruments is {y˜t−1, y˜t−2, p˜it−1, p˜it−2, f˜t−1, f˜t−2}. Given the few number of degrees of
freedom for Israel, we use the 3SLS method for this country. Chile is excluded from this exercise because
of lack of interest rate data.
13Given the underlying model, this exercise is likely to be subject to the Lucas criticism. But comparing
the implications of λCONS in terms of optimal policy rule with respect to those delivered by λKM in
another model would be less convincing than choosing exactly the same model as KM used.
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are generated. The first is noted iˆKM,t (= β
∗
y,KM y˜t + β
∗
pi,KM p˜it). The second is iˆCONS,t (=
β∗y,CONS y˜t + β
∗
pi,CONSp˜it). The two interest rates will be compared, in order to answer
the following question: do the differences between λCONS and λKM imply very different
reaction coefficients, and therefore really different Taylor rates?
The figures 7 to 9 in appendix 2 represent on the one hand the paths of simulated and
actual14 interest rates (left-side scale), and on the other hand the difference (in grey bars)
between the two simulated series (right-side scale). Combined with the results reported in
table 4 (cf. appendix 1), it appears that the countries can be divided into three categories:
1) Countries for which λCONS and λKM are approximately the same: Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
and United Kingdom. For these countries, the two series of simulated rates are
inherently equivalent.
2) Countries for which the λ are different, but for which the elasticities of β∗pi,k and β
∗
y,k
to λ are weak (k = {CONS,KM}). Despite the a priori differences in terms of λ, the
optimal reaction coefficients are very similar, and then the simulated interest rates
are comparable: Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and the United
States.
3) Countries for which the coefficients of conservatism are rather different, and so are the
coefficients β∗y and β
∗
pi. This is the case for: Australia, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Korea Republic and Turkey. But does this mean that the simulated interest rates
are necessarily different? In order to compare them, we proceed to the following
regression: iˆCONS,t = δiˆKM,t + ut and test H0 : δ = 1. According to the results
reported in table 5 (appendix 1), the null hypothesis of equivalence between the two
simulated series is accepted (at the 1% level) for Australia, Austria, Ireland, Korea
Republic and Turkey15.
As a general result, the equivalence between iˆCONS,t and iˆKM,t is only doubtful for
two countries: Italy and Greece. Nevertheless, for Greece, the difference concerning the
14Note that the actual and simulated interest rates are demeaned. Moreover, some significant gaps with
the paths of actual interest rates can sometimes be observed. This can be explained by the fact that
the gradual adjustment of interest rate is neglected, in order again to match the model and policy rule
considered by KM. Anyway, finding the set of parameters allowing to fit well the actual rate goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
15Note that for a large majority of countries, the variance of the difference between the two simulated
series is very weak (tending easily to 0.0001 for instance). It is logical: the two policy rules only differ (very
often weakly) by the way they react more or less strongly to inflation and output gap. If the latter does not
move very much, iˆKM,t can stay a long time above or below iˆCONS,t, with a constant gap (corresponding to
the differences in reaction coefficients). But if the error variance tends to zero, so does the variance of the
estimator of δ. As a result, testing (H0) the equivalence between iˆCONS and iˆKM yields an overwhelmingly
high statistic, leading to a doubtful rejection of H0, even if the two series are obviously equivalent. Last,
this means that, for Italy and Greece, the simulated interest rates series might not be as different as what
is obtained according to the statistical test.
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1980-1998 sample mean value of λ is mainly due to the sole difference observed for the
1989-1994 sub-period. For the three other sub-periods, CONS and KM are roughly the
same. For the 23 remaining countries, the measure of conservatism provided by KM is
certainly equivalent to ours.
5 Using CONS index: some research perspectives and
guidelines
In this section, we briefly discuss the relevance of our measure of CBC and outline several
practical suggestions for further empirical research. As emphasized above, the CONS
index is not model-dependent. This index is therefore easily expandable in time and space
to a large sample of countries, whatever the monetary regime in place. Moreover, it is
easy to calculate, as only data on inflation and GDP are required. These are considerable
advantages in comparison with CBC measures previously developed in the literature.
In practical terms, CONS index can find many empirical applications, both as depen-
dent and explanatory variable. In the first case, it could typically be employed to test
whether the changes in Central Banks’ preferences can explain the “Great Moderation”,
characterized by a widespread decline of inflation rates. Indeed, as shown in figure 3, it
seems that there exists a relatively tight relationship between the degree of CBC and in-
flation performance. Consequently, it would be interesting to test econometrically if the
evolution of CBC has effectively contributed, with other factors such as structural changes
and globalization, to the generalized disinflation observed during this period.
Concerning the use of CONS index as a dependent variable, we think that two research
areas merit further investigation. First, such an index can be useful to fill the gap in the
literature about the linkage between CBI and CBC. Although both contribute to the effec-
tive degree of inflation aversion of monetary policy, they are two different concepts. While
CBC deals with the degree of inflation aversion of the monetary authorities, CBI refers
to the economic and political freedom that are given to the Central Bank for conducting
policy in order to achieve its objectives (Lippi (1999)). Nevertheless, in accordance with
Rogoff (1985), most theoretical papers usually abstracted from the distinction between CBI
and CBC, assuming a monotonic relationship between the degree of independence and the
degree of conservatism. The first notable exception is the paper by Eijffinger & Hoeberichts
(1998), who show that conservatism and independence are strategic substitutes and that
there exists a trade-off between them, in the sense that a society can make the choice of
appointing a more conservative central banker to compensate a lack of CBI. Similar results
are more recently obtained by Hughes Hallett & Weymark (2005), Weymark (2007), and
Eijffinger & Hoeberichts (2008). Despite these theoretical developments, empirical studies
still do not distinguish between CBI and CBC, by using de jure and de facto indicators as
a proxy for CBC (see, e.g. Berger, De Haan & Eijffinger (2001), Hayo & Hefecker (2002)).
This gap between theoretical and empirical research is certainly due to the lack of easily
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computable CBC index. Hence, extending the CONS index to a larger sample of countries
would allow to empirically contribute to this debate, and to assess whether independent
Central Banks are really as conservative as their status suggest.
Moreover, CONS index can be used as a dependent variable to investigate the impact of
inflation targeting on the effective degree of conservativeness, and contribute to the debate
between the opponents and the proponents of this monetary policy strategy. On the one
hand, opponents consider inflation targeting Central Banks as “inflation nutters” (King
(1997)), with in their opinion an excessive focus on inflation objective to the detriment of
output stabilization. On the other hand, the proponents of inflation targeting claim that,
in practice, inflation targeting Central Banks pay attention to more than just inflation
objective. For them, inflation targeting is not a rule, but a framework of “constrained
discretion” (Bernanke & Mishkin (1997)) which allows for the stabilization of output.
Consequently, as suggested by the figure 4 (left plot), the CONS index could be used to
assess whether the adoption of inflation targeting has increased the degree of conservatism
of inflation targeter Central Banks.
Nevertheless, some precautions should be taken using the CONS index. Indeed, output
gap and inflation variabilities are not the prerogatives of the sole Central Bank. The
movement from point B to A in figure 1 for instance might not necessarily reflect the
conscious willingness of the Central Bank to give more priority to the inflation stabilization.
It can partially result from the decision of the government to adopt a more conservative
stance in terms of fiscal policy, or from the combination of supply and demand shocks.
Concerning the influence of shocks, two cases can be identified. On the one hand,
when the CBC index is used as an explanatory variable, these disturbances can directly be
taken into account in an index like CONS, by weighting the ratio σ2y/σ
2
pi by σ
2
εy/σ
2
εpi in the
formula (2), with σ2εpi the variance of the supply shocks and σ
2
εy the variance of the demand
shocks. We have calculated such a weighted CONS indicator (labelled CONS W ), with
shocks identified from structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models16. The values of
CONS W for the sample of 32 countries are represented in table 6 in appendix 3. In
comparison with CONS, the CBC appears to be higher for Israel, Portugal, Iceland,
Estonia, and to a lesser extend for Ireland. On the contrary, the CBC appears to be lower
for Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark and to a lesser extend for Australia.
No radical changes are observed for the 22 remaining countries. The figure 6 (left plot)
confirms that the correlation between CONS and CONS W is high over the 4 sub-periods
(the Pearson coefficient reaches 0.89).
16The estimated reduced-form VAR models include the output gap, the inflation rate and the short term
nominal interest rate. The restrictions on the structural model, required to proceed to its identification, are
imposed in reference to the standard small-scale DGSE models widely used in monetary macroeconomics
(See e.g. Woodford (2003)). They concern in particular a contemporaneous link between the short interest
rate and both inflation and output gap (such as in a Taylor Rule). All details, including the implied optimal
interest rate paths, are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 6: Correlation of CONS W with CONS and KM
Moreover, it is worth noting that for Germany, Ireland and Portugal CONS W is closer
than CONS to KM . As a whole, considering the sample of 25 countries depicted both
in the KM sample and in ours, and with respect to the analysis already developed in
the previous section, changes are likely to concern only Israel and Denmark17 (and to a
lesser extend Australia). The test of equivalence between the optimal interest rate paths
implied by λKM and λCONS W (i.e. the mean value of CONS W over the all period) leads
to accept H0 for Israel (Statistics = 0.99 with P-Value = 0.381) but to reject H0 for
Denmark (Statistics = 5.61 with P-Value = 0.005). The figure 10 in appendix 3 illustrates
this gap for Denmark and Israel18. More, since CONS W is not different from CONS
for Italy and Greece, we can conclude that CONS W is significantly different from KM
for Italy, Greece and Denmark. For the remaining 29 countries, the equivalence holds.
The fact that taking the shocks into account does not disrupt the results obtained with
CONS implies that the latter is per se a good measure of CBC. One possible reason is
that Central Banks readjust their stance following major shocks, in order to maintain their
initial degree of conservatism. As a consequence, the impact of shocks would be diluted
when using relatively low frequency data such as a 5-year sub-period. The figure 6 (right
plot) illustrates the high correlation between CONS W and KM (Pearson coefficient =
0.68). On the other hand, when the CONS index has to be used as a dependent variable, it
is also possible to use CONS W . But an alternative method for controlling shocks would
consist in simply adding σ2εy and σ
2
εpi as right-hand side variables.
In the same way, it is important to neutralize the influence of government preferences
with control variables such as the structural deficit (i.e. a measure which denotes the actual
leanings of the government, once the effects of the automatic stabilizers are neutralized),
which are likely to explain the position of a country in the (σ2pi, σ
2
y)-plan.
17In terms of average values of CBC indexes, λKM , λCONS and λCONS W are equal to 0.330, 0.374 and
0.781 for Israel, and respectively to 0.858, 0.834 and 0.756 for Denmark. Note that Estonia, Slovakia, the
Czech Republic and Iceland do not belong to the KM sample.
18Note that the equivalence between îCONS W,t and îKM,t is accepted for Australia, with statistics =
2.81 and P-Value = 0.07.
15
Finally, the position and the potential movements of the Taylor curve in this plan are
worth pointing out. The Phillips Curve and the efficiency of the monetary policy are likely
to explain them. For example, a more efficient monetary policy would trigger a leftward
movement of the Taylor Curve, what makes σ2y and σ
2
pi jointly decrease. Nevertheless,
whatever this position, a given economy at a given date does have a (σ2pi, σ
2
y)-pair which
can be interpreted in terms of CBC (cf. figure 1). In other words, any movement of the
Taylor Curve does not annihilate the inflation/output trade-off. Note that this point in
itself casts some doubts on the assumption that the preferences of the CB are entirely
structural-dependent. Indeed, while structural parameters (such as the NAIRU or the
sacrifice ratio in this case) are likely to explain the position of the Taylor Curve, they are
insufficient for explaining the position of the economy on this curve. The latter should
depend on other factors, in particular on institutional and political ones. We consider the
CONS index to be adequate to test in depth these theoretical insights19, and as a whole
to conduct a large empirical study on the CBC determinants.
6 Concluding remarks
Given the few attempts to reveal the Central Banks’ preferences and their limited reliability,
the aim of this paper was to provide a simple and intuitive measure of Central Banks’
Conservatism (CBC). To this end, we suggest an empirical measure, based on the Taylor
Curve, labeled CONS. Contrary to the previous measures developed in the literature, this
indicator is model-independent, and can easily be expanded in time and space, whatever
the underlying monetary regime in place. We demonstrate that the CONS indicator has
evolved in accordance with the monetary experiences of 32 OECD countries from 1980.
Moreover, this index is largely equivalent to the model-based measure provided by Krause
& Me´ndez (2005), including in terms of implied optimal monetary policy. We finally bring
forward the interest of and the precautions to take with such an indicator for further
empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of Central Banks. A lot of fields of research
could benefit from such an indicator, like studying the relation between CBC and Central
Banks’ Independence, assessing the influence of CBC on macroeconomic performance, or
examining the impact of Inflation Targeting adoption on CBC. Besides, the CONS index
will allow to study in depth and understand all the factors that determine the actual degree
of Central Banks’ conservatism.
19Krause & Me´ndez (2005, 2008) precisely examine the effects of institutional and political factors on
their CBC measure, but without controlling for the shocks, for the governments’ preferences, nor for the
potential effects of structural breaks.
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Appendix 1: Method and results of policy rules opti-
mization
The system (3) can be written in matrix form as: A1Xt = A2Xt−1+Wt, with the vector of all
model variables Xt =
[
y˜t y˜t−1 p˜it p˜it−1 i˜t f˜t f˜t−1
]′
, with the vector of (zero mean) serially
uncorrelated disturbances Wt = [εyt εpit εit εft]
′, whose covariance matrix is given by
Ω = E (WW ′). The model can equivalently be written Xt = BXt−1+St, with B ≡ A−11 A2,
St ≡ A−11 Wt and Σ = E (SS ′) = A−11 Ω
(
A−11
)′
the associated covariance matrix. Note that
estimating the system (3) comes to estimate B, S and W . We assume, as in KM, that
cov (εy, εpi) = 0.
Next, the optimization program consists in solving:
Min
{θ}
L = λjV ar (p˜i) + (1− λj)V ar (y˜)
s.t. Xt = B(θ)Xt−1 + St
with θ =
{
β∗pi,j, β
∗
y,j
}
and j = {CONS,KM}
Following Svensson (2000)20, the unconditional contemporaneous covariance matrix of
X, noted V , is given in vector form by:
V ec(V ) = [I −B ⊗B]−1 V ec(Σ) (4)
Unconditional variances for the inflation rate and for the output gap are obtained by
selecting the appropriate component in V ec(V ). Precisely, the unconditional variance of y˜t
and p˜it are the first and 17
th element of V ec(V ) respectively. So the optimization program
consists in selecting the couple
(
β∗pi,j, β
∗
y,j
)
which gives the lowest value of the loss function
defined as the sum of the first and 17th elements of V ec(V ), respectively weighted by
(1− λj) and λj (the BFGS algorithm is used to this end).
Finally, substituting
(
βˆpi, βˆy
)
, the estimated reaction coefficients, by the solution
(
β∗pi,j, β
∗
y,j
)
,
and launching dynamic historical simulations for the system allows to generate sequences
of simulated interest rates (under the respective degree of conservatism λKM and λCONS).
20See also Ball (1997) and Jondeau & Le Bihan (2002) for instance.
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Country Value of λ(1) β∗y β
∗
pi Country Value of λ
(1) β∗y β
∗
pi
Australia λKM = 0.641 1.28 1.26 Korea. Rep. λKM = 0.679 1.21 1.24
λCONS = 0.513 1.41 0.95 λCONS = 0.509 1.33 0.55
Austria λKM = 0.909 0.23 0.71 Mexico λKM = 0.107 2.44 1.53
λCONS = 0.736 0.33 0.63 λCONS = 0.069 2.46 1.49
Belgium λKM = 0.854 1.30 3.03 Netherlands λKM = 0.799 0.22 4.30
λCONS = 0.800 1.59 2.89 λCONS = 0.769 0.21 4.29
Canada λKM = 0.880 0.35 1.62 New Zealand λKM = 0.700 0.77 1.61
λCONS = 0.793 0.41 1.58 λCONS = 0.526 0.74 1.41
Denmark λKM = 0.858 2.08 1.75 Norway λKM = 0.809 0.56 0.21
λCONS = 0.834 2.04 1.40 λCONS = 0.774 0.53 0.13
Finland λKM = 0.835 0.41 1.77 Portugal λKM = 0.843 0.26 2.05
λCONS = 0.856 0.39 1.83 λCONS = 0.691 0.33 2.05
France λKM = 0.628 1.43 1.36 Spain λKM = 0.697 0.45 0.64
λCONS = 0.637 1.42 1.39 λCONS = 0.814 0.40 0.68
Germany λKM = 0.754 0.13 2.22 Sweden λKM = 0.739 0.51 1.90
λCONS = 0.827 0.13 2.23 λCONS = 0.733 0.51 1.89
Greece λKM = 0.569 0.97 2.11 Switzerland λKM = 0.770 1.73 1.85
λCONS = 0.502 0.85 1.78 λCONS = 0.766 1.73 1.82
Ireland λKM = 0.857 2.27 3.84 Turkey λKM = 0.202 0.93 0.93
λCONS = 0.659 4.08 2.64 λCONS = 0.076 0.90 0.78
Israel λKM = 0.330 4.11 2.23 United Kingdom λKM = 0.628 2.20 1.90
λCONS = 0.374 3.91 2.56 λCONS = 0.637 2.19 1.96
Italy λKM = 0.731 0.47 2.47 United States λKM = 0.860 0.30 2.49
λCONS = 0.477 0.86 2.01 λCONS = 0.782 0.34 2.48
Japan λKM = 0.886 0.53 1.20
λCONS = 0.826 0.57 1.11
(1): λ correspond to the mean value of λKM and λCONS over the period 1980-1998.
Table 4: Optimal Coefficients of Reaction (β∗pi and β
∗
y) induced by λKM and λCONS
Country Stat. P-Value
Australia 2.79 0.067
Austria 3.10 0.052
Greece 85.2 0.000
Italy 40.6 0.000
Korea Republic 3.70 0.030
Turkey 0.13 0.881
Table 5: Tests of equivalence between iˆCONS,t and iˆKM,t
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Appendix 2: Figures of simulated interest rates
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Figure 7: Actual interest rates, simulated interest rates, and difference between simulated
interest rates (cont’d)
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Figure 8: Actual interest rates, simulated interest rates, and difference between simulated
interest rates (cont’d)
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Figure 9: Actual interest rates, simulated interest rates, and difference between simulated
interest rates
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Appendix 3: The CONS W index
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Figure 10: Actual interest rates, simulated interest rates, and difference between simulated
interest rates (CONS W )
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Country 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-98 Average 80-98
Australia 0.291 0.952 0.538 0.071 0.463
Austria 0.343 0.759 0.953 0.969 0.756
Belgium 0.639 0.711 0.940 0.931 0.805
Canada 0.429 0.972 0.858 0.975 0.808
Chile 0.736 0.808 0.596 0.821 0.741
Czech Republic 0.381 0.944 0.662
Denmark 0.591 0.994 0.958 0.480 0.756
Estonia 0.353 0.353
Finland 0.522 0.961 0.940 0.997 0.855
France 0.187 0.842 0.884 0.891 0.701
Germany 0.306 0.773 0.952 0.929 0.740
Greece 0.750 0.488 0.408 0.487 0.533
Iceland 0.774 0.986 0.880
Ireland 0.304 0.727 0.943 0.976 0.737
Israel 0.946 0.615 0.781
Italy 0.569 0.543 0.757 0.209 0.520
Japan 0.736 0.828 0.938 0.819 0.830
Korea Republic 0.040 0.491 0.595 0.927 0.513
Mexico 0.013 0.019 0.041 0.029 0.025
Netherlands 0.661 0.388 0.979 0.968 0.749
New Zealand 0.419 0.362 0.806 0.443 0.508
Norway 0.662 0.966 0.677 0.955 0.815
Poland 0.002 0.199 0.100
Portugal 0.880 0.951 0.759 0.620 0.802
Slovak Republic 0.062 0.062
Slovenia 0.001 0.498 0.250
Spain 0.578 0.759 0.980 0.927 0.811
Sweden 0.608 0.944 0.665 0.699 0.729
Switzerland 0.833 0.772 0.631 0.818 0.764
Turkey 0.057 0.050 0.142 0.083
United Kingdom 0.151 0.830 0.650 0.924 0.639
United States 0.585 0.948 0.713 0.893 0.785
Note: The CONS W index is calculated following the formula: (1/90)×
[
atan
(
σ2y/σ
2
pi
σ2εy/σ
2
εpi
)
× 180
pi
]
The estimation covers the period 1980-1998 excepted for Iceland (beginning at 1988 Q1), Israel (1990 Q2), the Czech
Rep. (1982 Q3), Turkey (1987 Q1), Poland (1991 Q1), Slovenia (1992 Q4), Estonia (1993 Q4) and the Slovak Rep.
(1992 Q1), because interest rate data are unavailable (i.e. SVAR model can not be estimated) before.
Table 6: The CONS W index for 32 OECD Countries (4 sub-periods and average)
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